administrative governance makes each territory's experience unique and indispensable for the reconstruction of the empire's overall history. One would think that it is awareness of this fact and the appeal of historical experience that call for the reconstruction of imperial administrative practices. However, this is not the case. Both scholarly literature and the statements of contemporary politicians on the topic convincingly demonstrate just how poorly the Russian intellectual community is informed in this respect. We still have no analytical summary of the Russian Empire's experience of governing the provinces. Our knowledge is especially incomplete concerning the mechanisms of self-organization in the framework of state-building.
In this context, new information derived from managerial documents and record keeping produced by the authorities charged with administrative supervision could bring welcome changes to the existing state of research.
In the 19 th century, institutional reforms of the Russian police followed one after another.
The Ministry of the Interior was created in 1802. A short while later, the Ministry of Police was instituted in its stead (1810-1819). After the Decembrists' revolt, the political police was reorganized during 1826-1827, and the Third Section of His Majesty's Own Imperial Chancellery (Tretia sektsiia Ego Imperatorskogo Velichestva Kantseliarii, hereafter the Third Section) was established 4 . The institution of a special 'surveillance police' (nabliudatel'naia politsiia) pursued the purpose of removing the Russian Gendarmerie from the Ministry's executive jurisdiction, which would allow the former to give an 'unbiased' assessment and armslength judgment on the efficiency of various bodies of state administration. Reporting directly to the emperor, the political police was immune to governmental and institutional pressure. In 1880, the Third Section was replaced by the Department of Police, which survived until 1917.
This brief survey shows that throughout the 19 th century the supreme authorities were looking for an optimal form of police surveillance over the administrative apparatus. the Third Section that information of all kinds was sent from every corner of the Russian empire.
Here, the gendarme officers' reports on administrative irregularities and anything else of interest to the political police were preserved, and the intelligence -communicated through memoranda, reports, briefs, and surveys -was systematized for presentation to the emperor. The texts of these reports offered a detailed interpretation of the opinions of provincial residents regarding their local authorities.
Social history focuses on the means of group self-organization and practices of professional self-identification. The history of guidelines for the political police in the Russian empire allows us to evaluate the means of self-representation utilized by the authorities, as well as their construction of the self -not only as an enemy within, but also as a 'researcher' amongst the 'natives'. Archival documents of the Special Corps of Gendarmes for the years 1826-1836 provide ample grounds in favor of this approach to the subject matter.
In the Soviet Union, a study of almost any imperial governing institution was rather limited in scope. Historians of the time had little patience for 'bourgeois institutions', with the 'surveillance police' being the only exception, as it served as an illustration of a centuries-old struggle of the tsarist regime with revolutionary ideas. Scholarly literature mostly viewed the Third Section as a penal institution. A departure from the official interpretation was first made possible by the contribution of international historians to the study of the secret police of adopted a functionalist approach, which views the matter in hand as a quest for efficient governance in the framework of ethnic and cultural diversity 7 .
The majority of scholars focused their attention on von Benkendorff's political activity and his influence on the emperor's decisions. This being so, the activities of the Special Corps of Gendarmes, of which von Benkendorff was the chief, meaning the everyday routines of the political police, remained virtually unknown. It was only recently that the notion of the corrective role the gendarme officers played in the imperial administration appeared, due to the development of regional studies on government institutions 8 . Since this is usually just a peripheral subject for regional historians, and because documents on general policies are scarce 
Establishment of the Secret Police
The foundations of the Russian Gendarmerie were laid by an Edict of His Imperial Changes affecting the means of administrative control and the supreme authority's political settings were due not only to the personality of the emperor and his personal power tactics: they were also prompted by the experience of studying and resolving provincial conflicts The creation of the secret police went hand in hand with conceptualizing the experience of the Decembrist movement and the struggle against it. Consequently, on December 6, 1826, the secret committee gathered to work out a new concept of state governance. As a result, the Second Section of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery was established, with an intention to see through an old project of codifying the law. As Nicholas I and his associates hoped, this measure would help stabilize the state, make its administrative system more efficient, and thus save the country from social disorders and civil wars. Starting from 1829, staff officers were appointed to each province. Later on, the structure of the Corps continued to grow larger and more complex. New districts appeared with centers in Warsaw, Tobolsk, and Tiflis. By 1836, there were 66 staff officers and 56 adjuncts 15 .
The significance of these structural and territorial innovations is revealed by von
Benkendorff's clarifications made at one of the meetings of the secret committee in 1826.
According to him, the reorganization of the secret police aimed essentially to create the institute 
Instructions for the Gendarmes
The tradition to give the gendarme officers special instructions came about in the time of Alexander I. Scholarship on the topic presents the history of the first instructions for gendarmes rather schematically and confusingly. We know that the first directive of the chief of gendarmes, also known as the original, or basic instruction for an employee of the Third Section, 19 was somewhat different from its complementary edition 20 , and that the two operated unchanged throughout the reign of Nicholas I. However, the questions, such as for whom, how, and when these documents were created, have thus far not been answered satisfactorily 21 .
The It is easy to see that von Benkendorff's first directive, full of verbose commonplaces, was a declaration of intent more than a set of practical guidelines. This was a moral code of sorts, outlining the basic principles of the 'higher police' (vysshaia politsiia). These principles aimed 9 to shape the gendarme officers' social responsibility for society and an enlightened government: a gendarme stands on guard for truth and order 23 .
The directive may have addressed outsiders as well. In spite of its being a secret missive, the news of the directive spread quickly. The Third Section likely gave its blessing for the information leak, so the public would view the gendarme officers as carriers of the highest will and as observers independent from government and with immediate access to the emperor. The aura of secrecy surrounding this document did its part. Many high-ranking officials were familiar with its contents, but no copies were circulating. The earliest briefs by the gendarme staff officers quite frequently reported on how the gendarmes were perceived by the provincial and metropolitan population and by individual officials. This verification by public opinion could help adjust the Gendarmerie's fields of concern and simultaneously make the position of the Third Section stronger. To quote a relevant fragment of the report by major-general A.A.
Volkov, chief of the Second Moscow District of the Corps of Gendarmes, 'In fact, the party of the governor-general Prince Golitsyn, displeased by the establishment of our service or, to say it more openly, by the fact that our service may disclose their activities, vigilantly follows … my every movement and makes ready to let arrows fly at us at a moment's notice.' 24 The civil governor general of the Kaluga province, Prince A.P. Obolenskii, adhered to the opposite opinion. He perceptively asserted, 'The establishment of the Corps of Gendarmes is rather beneficial for Russia in her present weakened condition, and many actions of the gendarmes are the shortest way towards improving the state. All governors-general must be glad to receive help, which, by virtue of not being prosecutorial in form, is all the freer and more successful at eradicating evil and restoring the well-being of citizens.'
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Differences of opinion and apprehension among governors-general were to be expected.
The newly arrived 'policemen of integrity', with their bright uniforms and secret powers, were very different from the self-serving senators who used to inspect the provinces. The gendarmeson a mission and acting at a distance from their headquarters -were quick to create new corporate traditions.
Each agent received secret instructions defining his conduct in the 'culture' in question.
However, just like anthropologists, the reality that the first gendarme researchers had to face was much more complex than the written prescriptions. The problems and conflicts the first gendarmes encountered are recorded in the correspondence the chief of gendarmes maintained with district generals and chiefs of provincial branches. with questions, responses and clarifications, discussions, and directives concerning gendarme powers -was at its peak in 1827-1828.
This was the first, transitional period in the history of the Corps of Gendarmes: one that required greatest responsibility. It was the time of trial and error. Any officer could take initiative, come forward with a suggestion or criticism. Although their reports were structured in compliance with uniform questionnaires, the resulting narratives displayed features of all kinds of different genres. These texts make it obvious that the observers had difficulties defining exactly what they were supposed to observe. The narrowing of the focus depended on the political idiosyncrasies of an individual staff officer. It was up to his personal voice in the report to quench the headquarters' thirst for information.
In the period in hand, colonel Zhemtchuzhnikov was considered the most successful correspondence creates an impression that the first years of the Corps' existence were marked mostly by prohibitions. In fact, the dry formulas were the result of a painstaking work on 11 creating a new profession from scratch. By means of explanations and prohibitions, the chief of the secret police disciplined his subordinates and transformed them into enlightened researchers of the Empire. He demanded that they maintain objectivity and distance in respect of administrative bodies and persons, which required both intellectual and psychological efforts.
The practice of written discussions of instructions issued from above also continued in later years: I was able to trace it up to mid-1850s, making it is safe to call it a tradition. One of the archival files of the Third Section preserved a whole collection of 'considerations regarding the usefulness of instructions' from various years 32 . In the absence of special professional education for the secret police's human resources, one may see this practice of communal discussion as a practice of professional self-regulation and self-control.
An analysis of the gendarme reports from the first decade allows me to conclude that their institutional competencies formed from within, both casually and collectively. Secret 
